History论文模板 – The Three Secret Channels

This research paper looks at Nixon and Kissinger’s pursuit of stringent secrecy as a significant characteristic of the early 1970s US-China reconciliation. Nixon’s presidential authority led the new China endeavour and Kissinger’s skill as a skilled player and conciliator. Nixon and Kissinger discreetly communicated with Chinese authorities through secret channels, a direct mediation via the administration correspondence, circumventing usual conciliatory means and meetings by using other partners like Pakistan, Paris and Romania.[1] Nixon and Kissinger placed a premium on the effectiveness and rapidity of their back-channel exchanges.

Literature Review

Nixon and Kissinger had a deadline to meet: they intended to see the reconciliation with China achieved well before the 1972 presidential election.[2] They wanted acclaim for a meaningful breakthrough that put an end to Beijing’s two-decade-long antagonism. Nixon hoped to gain global recognition as a peacemaker by opening up to China, bolstering his domestic political clout. For nearly thirty years, a group of veteran officers, academics, and journalists has painted a completer and more accurate image of the US-China reconciliation; see, for instance, the fundamental reasons in the extant works on the Kissinger era.[3]

Scholars throughout the 1970s include: Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Safire, Price, Morris, Szulc, Haldeman, and Walters

According to Komine, journalists and former US officials like Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Safire, Price, Morris, Szulc, Haldeman, and Walters all added to the chronology of the US-China unification throughout the 1970s. The investigation of the discreet foreign policy operation of US reconciliation with China was the main topic of these studies.[4] Many details were exposed in the early writings of the 1970s, including the exchange of delicate diplomatic messages between 1969 and 1971, secret channels conversations with the Chinese through the three secret channels, and eventual Kissinger’s confidential travel to Beijing.[5] His function as a policy operative and mediator in covert foreign policy became the focal point for the subsequent writing.

Scholars of the late 1970s to the late 1980s include: Bell, Hoffmann, Gaddis, Litwak, and Schulzinger

Several writers, including Bell, Hoffmann, Gaddis, Litwak, and Schulzinger, carried comprehensive and serious assessments of the US-China worldwide strategic approach of a political-military downturn and a negotiated settlement with China led by Nixon and Kissinger.[6] These researchers examine Kissinger’s early publications in-depth to evaluate essential themes in his political realism, like validity, stability, and balance of power. Kissinger argued that the globe’s multifaceted nature of influence and the constraints of US power resources must be recognized to maintain an open-ended suppression of Communism within a shifting global system marked by the easing of strict military and philosophical bipolarity and the advancement of economic and political geopolitics,

The Scholars of the early 1990s include Haig, Green, Stokes, and Holdridge,

Several scholars have cited more veteran US officials, including Haig, Green, Stokes, and Holdridge, who had narrated their encounters in greater depth in the 1990s, providing more detailed knowledge of the practical process of US-China conciliation.[7] Despite the State Department’s purposeful and intentional isolation, Nixon and Kissinger relied mainly on it for various policy assessments led by Marshall-Green. Additionally, without realizing the US administration actual goals, a handful of individuals and regional specialists explicitly and implicitly led to the formation of China policy.[8] Former ambassadors’ memoirs expose a few of Nixon and Kissinger’s tactics discreetly employed, such as bureaucratic research as part of the NSSM process. Kissinger struggled as an operator despite being the most intelligent member of the NSC staff. While Nixon preferred not to cross paths with other senior figures face to face, Kissinger profited immensely from Haig’s bureaucratic expertise and Haldeman’s contribution as a go-between with the department of state. Haldeman was aboard when Nixon and Kissinger had confidential meetings concerning China strategy. As a result, his writings are essential in determining when Nixon and Kissinger debated China strategy.

Moreover, many journalists and historians have looked into new historical sources on the US-China reconciliation, producing more rigorous and illuminating analyses. Isaacson defined Kissinger’s persona, comprising of an evaluation of his covert strategies and bargaining manner. Isaacson’s book was founded on several interviews, one of which was with Kissinger himself. Bundy emphasizes the relevance of the tactical posture as one of the primary problems during the meeting between Kissinger and Zhou. At the same time, Mann looks at how the US and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) became implicit collaborators in the 1970s. Tyler looked at the evolution of Sino-Soviet demarcation line skirmishes in 1969 and the US, USSR, and PRC’s resulting strategic triangle.[9] However, as previously mentioned, the 1990s fell short of fully investigating the geopolitical circumstances in the Asia pacific.

Scholar of Recent Works: Ross and Jiang; Gong Li, Richard Reeves

Biographers and historians’ most contemporary works are founded on newly discovered archive materials. Ross and Jiang’s book contains sections on the evolution of American internal discourse on PRC and the reopening of diplomatic consultations in Warsaw.[10] Li examines the chronological process of China-US rapprochement from the standpoint of China’s top decision-makers. He investigates the decision-making mechanism during the period of reconciliation, analyzes the elements that influenced it, and justifies China’s sudden policy reversal.[11] Moreover, there are other authors whose writings are drawn on published archival documents from the 1970s through 2001 on the same topic.[12] Reeves attempted to recreate the Nixon administration from the front by providing a precise chronological narrative. During Nixon’s outreach to China, he analyzed his conversations with international officials and key individuals in his government.[13] Kissinger established the strategic triangle known as Washington-Moscow-Beijing using the secret channels, which piqued Hanhimaki’s curiosity. As a result, he ignored the State Department’s and NSC duties and the influence of the new PRC strategy on the Asia Pacific countries.[14] Goh’s paper is the most recent on the United States’ relationship with China, and it is predicated on disclosed archival records up to 2001. 36. As Sino-US ties improved, she claims that China became America’s most obstinate foe to an ally and unspoken partner.[15] Generally, since this research had limited access to new archival data, it is feasible to carry a more extensive examination of US-China reunification than the above literature.

Bibliography

Carpenter, Ted. “G. 2000. Confusion and stereotypes: US policy toward the PRC at the dawn of the 21st Century.” China’s future: Constructive partner or emerging threat: 69-94.

Chang, Gordon H. “Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973.” (2004): 80-82.

Changbin, Jiang. “Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973.”

Cohen, Warren I. “Response to China: A History of Sino-American relations.” (2000).

Glenn, Patrick, and Bryan Gibson. An Analysis of Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and Making Our Times. CRC Press, 2017.

Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the US Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From’Red Menace’to’Tacit Ally’. Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Hanhimäki, Jussi M. ““Dr. Kissinger” or “Mr. Henry”? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting.” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (2003): 637-676.

Jones, Matthew. “Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” (2002): 898-898.

Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Classic Memoirs. Simon and Schuster, 2012.

Komine, Yukinori. Secrecy in US foreign policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the rapprochement with China. Routledge, 2016.

Komine, Yukinori. US Foreign Policy toward Sino-US Rappraochement in the Early 1970s: A Study of Secrecy in Bureaucratic Politics. Lancaster University (United Kingdom), 2005.

Kuisong, Yang. “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement.” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 21-52.

Li, Gong. “Chinese decision making and the thawing of US-China relations.” In Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, pp. 321-360. Brill, 2001.

MacMillan, Margaret. Nixon and Mao: The week that changed the world. Random House Incorporated, 2008.

McMahon, Robert J. “Robert Dallek. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: HarperCollins. 2007. Pp. xii, 740.” The American historical review 113, no. 1 (2008): 225-226.

Minami, Kazushi. “Re-examining the end of Mao’s revolution: China’s changing statecraft and Sino-American relations, 1973–1978.” Cold War History 16, no. 4 (2016): 359-375.

Myers, Ramon H. “Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” (2002): 597-599.

Nathan, Andrew J. “Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” China Review International 10, no. 2 (2003): 436-440.

Nelson, Keith L. “Détente Over Thirty Years.” A Companion to American Foreign Relations (2008): 422.

Odd Ame Westad, “The New International History of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, 24, 2000

Pechlivanis, Paschalis. “Between détente and differentiation: Nixon’s visit to Bucharest in August 1969.” Cold War History 17, no. 3 (2017): 241-258.

Pechlivanis, Paschalis. America and Romania in the Cold War: A Differentiated Détente, 1969–80. Routledge, 2019.

Phillips, Steven. “Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” (2004): 171-175.

Reeves, Richard. President Nixon: Alone in the White House. Simon and Schuster, 2001.

Ross, Robert S., and Changbin Jiang, eds. Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973. BRILL, 2020.

Spohr, Kristina, and David Reynolds, eds. Transcending the Cold War: summits, statecraft, and the dissolution of bipolarity in Europe, 1970–1990. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Sutter, Robert. “Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” (2004): 183-185.

Talley, Christian. Forgotten Vanguard: Informal Diplomacy and the Rise of United States-China Trade, 1972–1980. University of Notre Dame Press, 2018.

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. “Taiwan expendable? Nixon and Kissinger go to China.” The Journal of American History 92, no. 1 (2005): 109-135.

Warner, Geoffrey. “Nixon, Kissinger and the rapprochement with China, 1969–1972.” International Affairs 83, no. 4 (2007): 763-781.


[1]Pechlivanis, Paschalis. “Between détente and differentiation: Nixon’s visit to Bucharest in August 1969.” Cold War History 17, no. 3 (2017): 241-258; Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Classic Memoirs. Simon and Schuster, 2012; Robert J. McMahon, “Robert Dallek. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: HarperCollins. 2007. Pp. xii, 740. The American historical review 113, no. 1 (2008): 225-226;

[2] Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US foreign policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the rapprochement with China. Routledge, 2016.

[3] Westad Odd Ame, “The New International History of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, 24, (Fall 2000); Evelyn Goh, “From’red menace’to’tacit ally’: constructing the US rapprochement with China, 1961-1974.” PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2001; Jussi M Hanhimäki, ““Dr. Kissinger” or “Mr. Henry”? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting.” Diplomatic History 27, no. 5 (2003): 637-676; Patrick Glenn and Gibson Bryan, An Analysis of Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. CRC Press, 2017; Paschalis Pechlivanis, America and Romania in the Cold War: A Differentiated Détente, 1969–80. Routledge, 2019.

[4] Yukinori Komine, US Foreign Policy toward Sino-US Rappraochement in the Early 1970s: A Study of Secrecy in Bureaucratic Politics. Lancaster University (United Kingdom), 2005.

[5] Margaret MacMillan, Nixon and Mao: The week that changed the world. Random House Incorporated, 2008; Jian Chen, Mao’s China and the cold war. Univ of North Carolina Press, 2010.

[6] Keith L Nelson, “Détente Over Thirty Years.” A Companion to American Foreign Relations (2008): 422.

[7] Yukinori Komine, US Foreign Policy toward Sino-US Rappraochement in the Early 1970s: A Study of Secrecy in Bureaucratic Politics. Lancaster University (United Kingdom), 2005; Bernkopf Nancy Tucker, “Taiwan expendable? Nixon and Kissinger go to China.” The Journal of American History 92, no. 1 (2005): 109-135; Warner, Geoffrey. “Nixon, Kissinger and the rapprochement with China, 1969–1972.” International Affairs 83, no. 4 (2007): 763-781; Yukinori Komine, Secrecy in US foreign policy: Nixon, Kissinger and the rapprochement with China. Routledge, 2016; Kristina Spohr and Reynolds David, eds. Transcending the Cold War: summits, statecraft, and the dissolution of bipolarity in Europe, 1970–1990. Oxford University Press, 2016; Christian Talley, Forgotten Vanguard: Informal Diplomacy and the Rise of United States-China Trade, 1972–1980. University of Notre Dame Press, 2018.

[8] Ted Carpenter, “G. 2000. Confusion and stereotypes: US policy toward the PRC at the dawn of the 21st Century.” China’s future: Constructive partner or emerging threat: 69-94; Warren I. Cohen, “Response to China: A History of Sino-American relations.” (2000)

[9] Yukinori Komine, US Foreign Policy toward Sino-US Rappraochement in the Early 1970s: A Study of Secrecy in Bureaucratic Politics. Lancaster University (United Kingdom), 2005; Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement.” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 21-52.

[10] Robert Sutter, “Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” (2004): 183-185. Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds. Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973. BRILL, 2020.

[11] Gong Li, “Chinese decision making and the thawing of US-China relations.” In Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973, pp. 321-360. Brill, 2001.

[12] Kazushi Minami, “Re-examining the end of Mao’s revolution: China’s changing statecraft and Sino-American relations, 1973–1978.” Cold War History 16, no. 4 (2016): 359-375; Gordon H Chang, “Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973.” (2004): 80-82; Steven Phillips, “Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” (2004): 171-175; Jiang Changbin, “Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973; Ramon H Myers, “Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” (2002): 597-599; Andrew J. Nathan, “Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” China Review International 10, no. 2 (2003): 436-440; Matthew Jones, “Re-Examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973.” (2002): 898-898

[13] Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House. Simon and Schuster, 2001.

[14] Jussi M. Hanhimaki, The flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American foreign policy. Oxford University Press, 2004.

[15] Evelyn Goh, “From’red menace’to’tacit ally’: constructing the US rapprochement with China, 1961-1974.” PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2001.

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